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The Epistemology of Evolutionary Debunking
Justis Koon
1. Introduction
Moral  realism,  as  I  will  understand  it  here,  is  the  conjunction  of  four  theses:  that  moral
language should be interpreted literally, that moral claims express beliefs, that there are at least some
moral truths, and that these truths are mind- and language-independent.1  Sharon Street (2006; 2015)
and Richard Joyce (2006; 2013; 2016) have both advanced evolutionary debunking arguments which
purport to show that, if moral realism is true, our moral beliefs are systematically unjustified.2  These
arguments are motivated by recent empirical work on the evolution of morality, work which suggests
that the human moral sense was selected chiefly to promote cooperation among small tribes of hunter-
gatherers in our distant evolutionary past.3  If, however, our moral sense evolved due to the positive
contribution that cooperation made to our ancestors' reproductive fitness, it becomes something of a
mystery how it could also succeed in tapping into a well of mind-independent moral truths.  It seems
like it  would be  an extraordinary coincidence – in Street's  words, nothing short of a miracle – if
1 For comparison, Ayer-style emotivists will reject all four theses, error theorists will reject the third, and moral
relativists and constructivists will reject the fourth.  There are a few meta-ethical views – I am thinking 
especially of thin forms of reductive naturalism, like those defended by Copp (2008) and Sterelny and Fraser 
(2017) – where it is unclear whether we should categorize them as realist or anti-realist.  I will not be 
addressing these sorts of views here.
2 See Horn (2017) and Lutz (2018) for more recent presentations of evolutionary debunking arguments, and 
Korman (2019) for a review of the evolutionary debunking literature.
3 See Section 3.5 and the references therein.
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evolutionary forces indifferent to the moral truth somehow shaped our faculties to be appropriately
sensitive to it.
Contrast the situation for vision.  Any plausible account of the evolution of our visual faculties
will  make  it  clear  that  they  were selected  to  capture  information about  the color,  shape,  texture,
brightness, and relative distance of objects in our visual field, and to produce beliefs that accurately
reflect these features of our surroundings.4  We should not expect natural selection to have made our
vision perfectly reliable, of course, both because selection is not all-powerful and must work within
existing physical and biological constraints, and because visual illusions may, in rare circumstances, be
adaptive.  But, generally speaking, it will be an enormous boon to an organism's fitness for it to have
an accurate picture of its environment, rather than being left in the dark about what goes on around it,
blind not only to the presence of food, water, and potential mates, but also to the threats posed by
predators and other hazards.  So evolutionary theory gives us every reason to think that our visual
faculties were selected primarily to produce true beliefs about the sources of the light waves impinging
on our retinas.  
But scientists tell a completely different sort of story when it comes to the evolution of our
moral sense, one on which it was selected not to produce true moral beliefs, but to enable us to reap
the benefits of cooperating with other members of our species.5  Joyce and Street have seized on this
peculiar feature of the evolutionary history of our moral sense and developed it into an argument
against moral realism.  For reasons others have cataloged, however, both Joyce and Street's accounts
of evolutionary debunking contain serious defects, especially in the epistemic principles they rely on to
generate their conclusions.6  This paper is an attempt to address some of the problems that have been
4 Yong (2016) gives a nice popular overview of the evolution of vision.
5 Some philosophers writing on evolutionary debunking arguments, beginning with Street, contrast the thesis 
that our moral sense was selected to acquire true beliefs with the thesis that it was selected for survival and 
reproduction, or the thesis that it was selected to promote fitness.  This is a confusion; trivially, all selection 
favors organisms who are fitter or more successful at surviving and reproducing than their conspecifics, so it 
makes no sense to say that a trait was selected for survival and reproduction or for fitness.  What we are 
interested in when we inquire what a trait was selected for is which (if any) of its effects boosted our 
ancestors' reproductive fitness, and thereby caused the genes associated with that trait to proliferate 
throughout our species.  
6 See White (2010), Shafer-Landau (2012), Vavova (2014; forthcoming), Bogardus (2016), Clarke-Doane 
(2016), Sinclair (2018), and Clarke-Doane and Baras (2021).  The most important points of criticism, to my 
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identified for Joyce and Street's accounts, and, by so doing, move the evolutionary debunking project
they initiated onto surer footing.
Here is  how my approach differs  from theirs:  first,  to set  the stage,  I  introduce a thought
experiment that presents a striking analogy for the evolution of morality, and which demonstrates how
compelling evolutionary-debunking-style reasoning can be when applied to a case where we are not
antecedently invested in the outcome (Section 2).  Second, I carefully formalize a new evolutionary
debunking argument (Section 3.1) and show how the success of the evolutionary debunking project
depends, to a large extent, on the truth of calibrationist views of higher-order evidence (Section 3.2).
Third,  I  offer  a  new  rationale  for  why  learning  that  our  moral  sense  was  selected  to  facilitate
cooperation should undermine the justification for our moral beliefs (Section 3.3).  Finally, I respond
to  three  of  the  most  compelling  objections  which  have  been  raised  against  Street  and  Joyce's
debunking arguments (Section 4); employing the resources of calibrationism, and referring back to the
thought experiment from Section 2, will help to illuminate why these objections are unsuccessful.7
 One caveat before we proceed: for ease of exposition, I will be assuming throughout most of
this  paper that  human beings  have a moral  sense or faculty  whose function is  innately  specified,
comparable, in this respect, to our faculty for processing natural language.8  A number of philosophers
and  cognitive  scientists  have  disputed  this  assumption  on  empirical  grounds;9 towards  the  end
mind, are that Joyce's version of the argument depends on a causal epistemic principle that is widely believed 
to be false (although see Korman and Locke [2020] for a defense), while the epistemic principle Street 
invokes is not clearly spelled out but implausible on most interpretations.  The argument I develop in this 
paper replaces these principles with a version of the calibrationist view of higher-order evidence, which 
enjoys substantial (but by no means universal) support in the literature.  
7 I should note that it seems likely to me that any evolutionary debunking argument is liable to struggle with 
Moorean responses (Section 4.1) and third-factor explanations (Section 4.2) unless it avails itself of 
calibrationism and its associated independence requirement.  
8 I understand the moral sense to be the faculty that generates our gut reactions or intuitions in ethics, both 
about particular cases (real or hypothetical) and about general principles.  For instance, it is the moral sense 
which intimates to us that torturing children is wrong, that generosity is a virtue, and which makes “maximize
the amount of well-being in the world” – but not “maximize the amount of injustice in the world” – seem like 
a plausible  moral principle.  I suggest, moreover, that the moral sense plays an indispensable epistemic role 
in justifying our moral beliefs (inasmuch as they are justified at all); none of our moral beliefs could lay claim 
to any positive epistemic status if not for the base-level infusion of evidence supplied by the moral sense.  
Note, though, that nothing in this paper hangs on how I am conceiving of the moral sense.  In the end, I will 
argue that evolutionary debunking arguments succeed even if our brains turn out not to contain any kind of 
specialized faculty for moral cognition.
9 See Machery and Mallon (2010), FitzPatrick (2015), and Levy and Levy (2020).
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(Section 4.3) we will see whether relaxing it damages the debunking argument's prospects for success.
2. Evolutionary Debunking Not Ruled Out A Priori
Joyce  and Street's  debunking  arguments  have  faced  a  large  number  of  objections.   A  few
authors have even suggested that facts about our evolutionary history can never – not even in principle
– affect the epistemic status of our beliefs.10  Should we follow these philosophers in thinking that
debunking arguments are totally misconceived, that events from our distant evolutionary past just
have no bearing on whether our beliefs today are justified?  I do not think so.  To the contrary, I believe
we can be confident that some account of evolutionary debunking or other must succeed.  The proof of
this is that we are able to construct cases where evolutionary-debunking-style reasoning seems quite
compelling.  Here is one:
Fools Rush In   
In the year 2988, humanity makes first contact with an alien race, inhabitants of a lush and hospitable
planet orbiting a dim star in the Arcturus Stream.  In an unlikely case of convergent evolution, these
Transarcturians, as we come to call them, are nearly identical to humans of the early 21st century, with
our  computers  and  automobiles,  our  nation-states  and  mixed  economies,  our  universities  and
hospitals, and our science, philosophy, and ethics. Scans of the Transarcturian planet reveal only one
anomaly: huge regions of the globe have been left  to the virgin forest,  completely devoid of cities,
roads, and all other signs of civilization. The explorers inquire with the Transarcturian ambassador
after this curiosity, who, with some bewilderment, informs them that these are the planet's forbidden
zones, where no Transarcturian may tread. When pressed for an explanation why, the ambassador
responds, "Isn't it obvious? Because they are forbidden." 
The explorers drop the matter to avoid a diplomatic incident, but on the next expedition, a
science team is sent to one of the forbidden zones to investigate, mindful of the perils that may await
10 White (2010), for one, defends this view.
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them there.  They find bizarre and variegated vegetation, unlike anything else on the planet, and vast
underground deposits of lead, but nothing to account for the fear and reverence the forbidden zone
inspires among their hosts.  Their questions unanswered, they return to discuss their findings with a
physicist at one of the leading Transarcturian universities.  He shows little surprise or interest, and,
when asked to clarify what feature of the zones places them off-limits, replies, "The fact that they are
forbidden, of course! Can't you tell? Perhaps you had better direct your inquiries to a philosopher
instead, or a priest.  This is not really my area of expertise."
Stunned by this dismissal, the Earth scientists retreat to their spacecraft to try and puzzle out
what  they  have  observed.  After  much  discussion,  they  hit  on  the  hypothesis  that,  in  the  distant
evolutionary past of the Transarcturians, the regions of the planet now known as the forbidden zones
played  host  to  vast  deposits  of  radioactive  thorium,  since  decayed  into  lead.   Although  the
Transarcturians' physiology would have been hardy enough to protect them from any ill health effects
of the radiation, their gametes could not have resisted its mutagenic properties, and over hundreds of
thousands of  years (the Earth scientists conjecture),  the Transarcturians were selected to carry an
innate  psychological  predisposition  to  avoid  the  forbidden  zones,  to  reduce  the  risk  of  causing
mutations to their germline DNA.11  Strangely, the Transarcturians appear to experience this aversion
in normative terms – they don't just feel an urge to stay out of the forbidden zones, they perceive
themselves as having an obligation to do so.  Although wary of interfering in the development of a less
technologically advanced civilization, the Earth scientists ultimately resolve to share their conclusions
with the Transarcturians, wishing to liberate the race from its ancient and congenital superstition. 
To flesh out the story further, we can assume that whenever a Transarcturian approaches a
forbidden zone,  she has  an experience with a  distinct  phenomenal  character  – something like  an
11 Just so the thought experiment is not confounded by ethical concerns, I ask the reader to assume, somewhat 
implausibly, that the radiation would not have caused harmful congenital disorders in the Transarcturians' 
offspring, and that their disposition to avoid trespassing in the forbidden zones, if the Earth scientists' 
hypothesis is correct, is the result of selection operating directly on the Transarcturians' genes.  The idea is 
that any genes which predisposed the Transarcturians to steer clear of the forbidden zones were favored by 
selection just because those genes were less likely to be altered by the mutagenic effects of the radiation.
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intuition – with the content that she ought not proceed any further.12  Let's suppose, moreover, that
the Transarcturians have also devised complex systems of norms surrounding forbiddenness, and their
philosophers are continually disputing whether these norms should be understood in consequentialist
terms,  as  a  matter  of  minimizing  the  aggregate  amount  of  time  any  Transarcturian  spends  in  a
forbidden zone, or deontologically, as imposing a  pro tanto  duty not to encroach on the forbidden
zones which must be balanced against competing obligations.
It seems clear to me that as soon as the Transarcturians are informed of the Earth scientists'
hypothesis and its supporting evidence, they are no longer justified in retaining their normative beliefs
about  the  forbidden  zones,  not,  at  least,  if  those  beliefs  continue  to  be  construed  realistically.
Intuitively speaking, when the Transarcturians learn that their forbiddenness faculty may have been
selected to carry out a function unrelated to producing true beliefs, they can no longer trust that its
outputs are accurately representing features of the world around them.  It just does not seem plausible
to suggest that the Transarcturians should feel free to shrug off this revelation about their evolutionary
history, and carry on with their lives exactly as before.13  If they are rational, they must take seriously
the possibility that all of their attitudes towards the forbidden zones, along with the whole edifice of
norms they've constructed around them, are an elaborate sham or illusion foisted on them by their
genes.  In other words, when the Transarcturians learn that their forbiddenness beliefs may have a
deviant  causal  history,  one  not  properly  aimed at  truth,  this  appears  to  defeat  or  undermine  the
justification for those beliefs.14  
12 Note that the Transarcturians do not believe that the forbidden zones are, in general, dangerous; they see 
“forbiddenness” as an intrinsic normative feature of certain areas of their world, just as we see goodness as an
intrinsic normative feature of certain states of affairs.
13 Of course, if the Transarcturians could offer an alternative account of the etiology of their forbiddenness 
faculty suggesting that it was selected to produce true beliefs, and this account was clearly better-supported 
by the available evidence than the Earth scientists' conjecture, that would change their epistemic situation 
substantially.  But we are assuming they have no such account to offer.
14 Some externalists about justification may insist that the Transarcturians' forbiddenness beliefs, because they 
were unreliably formed, were never even prima facie justified, and hence cannot be undermined or defeated.  
Proponents of radically aprioristic moral epistemologies which hold that false moral beliefs can never be 
justified may be inclined to say the same thing.  There are two questions to separate here: the first is whether 
it makes sense to describe beliefs that are not prima facie justified as being undermined or defeated, while 
the second concerns how the Earth scientists' discovery should affect the epistemic status of the 
Transarcturians' beliefs, assuming they were never justified to begin with.  The first of these questions strikes 
me as a semantic matter of limited significance, so I will focus on the latter.  Even if we say the 
Transarcturians' forbiddenness beliefs were unjustified to begin with, there is still a clear sense, I think, in 
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The key point is that it is exceedingly difficult to see what chain of reasoning could lead us to
this  conclusion,  if  not  for  an  evolutionary  debunking  argument  roughly  along  the  lines  of  those
advanced  by  Joyce  and  Street.   Hence,  if  we  hope  to  capture  our  intuitive  verdict  about  the
Transarcturians, we must accept that information about our distant evolutionary past does have the
potential  to affect the epistemic status of  our present-day beliefs after  all.   We will  return to this
thought experiment later on, in Sections 4 and 5, but for now, let's get the debunking argument itself
on the table.
3. Evolutionary Debunking Redux
3.1 Overview of the Argument
Neither Joyce nor Street, in their original presentations of their debunking arguments, made
any attempt to formalize them.  Unfortunately, this ended has generated a large amount of confusion
about how their arguments are supposed to be structured.  Let me begin, then, by laying out what I
take  to  be  the  best  way  of  formalizing  the  core  evolutionary  debunking  argument  against  moral
realism:
Empirical Premise: We have good reason to think that our moral sense was selected principally for
functions other than producing true moral beliefs.
Etiological Principle: If moral realism is true, and if we have good reason to think that our moral sense
was selected principally for functions other than producing true moral beliefs, then, unless we are able
which they held those beliefs rationally, or reasonably, or blamelessly, prior to the revelation about their 
evolutionary history.  It's hard to fault them for trusting intuitions that are built into their minds from birth, 
and widely shared throughout their species.  My contention is that, after hearing about the Earth scientists' 
discovery, intuitively, their forbiddenness beliefs cease being rational, or reasonable, or blameless in this 
sense, and that this is the sort of change to a belief's epistemic status that would normally defeat its 
justification, had it been justified in the first place.  And, if this subjunctive or counterfactual claim about the 
Transarcturians' beliefs is true, that's all that will be needed to underwrite the intended analogy between the 
forbidden zones and morality.  Of course, realists have the option of biting the bullet and insisting that 
hearing about the Earth scientists' discovery should have no effect whatsoever on the epistemic status of the 
Transarcturians' beliefs.  But it seems to me that this still comes at the cost of saying something counter-
intuitive about the case.
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to  corroborate  that  our  moral  sense  is  reliable  through  the  use  of  some  other  belief-forming
mechanism whose  etiology  is  not  subject  to  similar  doubts,  the  balance  of  independent  evidence
suggests that our moral sense is unreliable.
Autonomy Clause: We are unable to corroborate that our moral sense is reliable through the use of
some other belief-forming mechanism whose etiology is not subject to similar doubts.
Epistemic  Principle:  If  the  balance  of  independent  evidence  suggests  that  our  moral  sense  is
unreliable, the justification for our moral beliefs is defeated.
Conclusion: If moral realism is true, the justification for our moral beliefs is defeated.15
In brief: the empirical premise observes that our moral sense has a suspicious evolutionary
history,  having been selected for purposes other than producing true moral beliefs; the etiological
principle posits that this sort of evolutionary history, under the assumption that moral realism is true,
gives us reason to suspect that our moral sense is unreliable; the autonomy clause establishes that our
moral beliefs cannot be rehabilitated by some other faculty whose epistemic credentials are above
reproach; and the epistemic principle  asserts  that  having reason to think that  our  moral  sense is
unreliable strips our moral beliefs of their justification.  By successive applications of modus ponens,
this leaves us with the conclusion that, if moral realism is true, none of our moral beliefs are justified.
Two notes are in order.  First, nothing hangs on the choice of justification as the epistemic
status targeted by the argument, and a similar evolutionary debunking argument could just as easily
place warrant or knowledge on the chopping block instead, mutatis mutandis.  Second, the argument
is intended as a reductio – as Shafer-Landau (2012: 1) puts it, the combination of moral realism and
moral skepticism implied by the conclusion is a “logically coherent position that contains about zero
15 Compare the formalizations in Shafer-Landau (2012) and Morton (2016).
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appeal.”  The hope is that those persuaded by the argument will be more inclined to jettison one of the
realist's package of metaphysical and linguistic theses, and adopt an anti-realist view instead, than to
stick to their guns about realism but abandon all claims to moral knowledge.  
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to motivating the premises of this argument and
defending it from objections.  Let's begin with the epistemic principle.
3.2 The Epistemic Principle
Contemporary theories of justification almost universally  incorporate a theory of defeat,  an
account of how a belief that is prima facie justified – by virtue of being supported by the evidence, for
instance  –  can  come  to  lose  its  justification.   A  schematic  version  of  the  debunking  argument's
epistemic principle spells out a sufficient condition for defeat:
Epistemic Principle (Schema): If the balance of independent evidence suggests that the belief-forming
mechanism which generates our beliefs in domain D is unreliable, the justification for our D-related
beliefs is defeated.16
This principle is not intended to cover all instances of defeat; it deals exclusively with cases
where we come across evidence calling our own reliability into question.  Evidence that one of our own
belief-forming  mechanisms  is  unreliable  is  a  type  of  higher-order  evidence  –  unlike  first-order
evidence, it does not bear directly, as it were, on the truth of our beliefs, but tells us that our capacity to
judge the evidence available to us has been compromised.17  
The epistemic principle is a consequence of standard formulations of calibrationism, the most
prominent theory of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence.18  Calibrationists hold that
16 Note that – as their names indicate – the schematic versions of both the epistemic principle and the 
etiological principle (Section 3.3) are supposed to be true for all substitution instances of their variables.  This
is not the case for the schematic versions of the autonomy clause (Section 3.4) or the empirical premise.
17 For helpful discussion of higher-order evidence, see Christensen (2010) and DiPaolo (2018).
18 Sliwa and Horowitz (2015) present a clear and accessible defense of the view.  See also White (2009), 
Christensen (2016), Schoenfield (2018), Vavova (2018), and Kappel (2019), along with Schoenfield (2015) 
and Isaacs (2021) for criticism.  Calibrationism is usually formulated in terms of credences, but for the sake of
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higher-order  evidence  is  relevant  to  the  epistemic  status  of  our  ordinary,  first-order  beliefs,  that
information about how reliable we are can affect whether our first-order beliefs are justified.  Suppose,
for  instance,  that  you  believe  that  p is  true,  but  you  also  have good reason  to  suspect  that  your
judgments on the subject are unreliable.  According to calibrationism, it is irrational to maintain your
belief  under these circumstances.  The right thing to do, says the calibrationist, is to heed your higher-
order evidence of unreliability, and abandon your first-order belief that p.  Thus, if you have higher-
order  evidence  that  one  of  your  belief-forming  mechanisms  is  systematically  unreliable,  as  the
debunker claims is true of our moral sense, calibrationism implies that you are no longer justified in
retaining any of the beliefs that it produces.19  
Of  special  note  is  the  independence  requirement  built  into  the epistemic  principle,  one  of
calibrationism's distinctive features.  When higher-order evidence calls the reliability of one of our
belief-forming mechanisms into question, the independence requirement tells us we must bracket off
the mechanism's outputs when figuring out how to respond, and make that determination on the basis
of the independent evidence alone.20  The idea is that the higher-order evidence indicts not just the
belief-forming  mechanism  itself,  but  its  outputs  as  well,  leaving  them  unsuitable  to  be  cited  as
evidence  or  reasons  for  belief.   Here  is  a  case  which  will  help  to  illustrate  the  need  for  this
requirement:
Delusions of Gander
A researcher working at DARPA informs her coworker Alex that, as a prank, she spiked his morning
simplicity, I will stick to all-or-nothing beliefs here.
19 For ease of exposition, I will be a bit careless in what follows about the distinction between (on the one hand) 
psychological mechanisms that produce beliefs as outputs and (on the other) psychological mechanisms that 
produce other cognitive states as outputs, such as perceptions or intuitions.  I will also occasionally run 
together the distinction between belief-forming mechanisms that are unreliable tout court and belief-forming 
mechanisms that are unreliable when used within some circumscribed domain.  Nothing of substance hangs 
on these distinctions, at least so far as this paper is concerned.
20 The independence requirement first emerged from the literature on peer disagreement, and most discussion 
of it has been restricted to that context.  Elga (2007) and Christensen (2007; 2009; 2011; 2018; 2019) defend 
the requirement, while Arsenault and Irving (2012), Kelly (2013), and Lord (2014) number among its 
detractors.  Vavova (2014) discusses the independence requirement in connection with evolutionary 
debunking.
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coffee with a psychotropic medication.  In clinical trials, she tells him, the drug had no effect on half of
subjects, while the other half experienced vivid hallucinations of geese for a day or two.  On Alex's way
home from work, he spies three geese frolicking in a field along the side of the road.  Disregarding his
colleague's warning, he comes to believe that there are three geese in the field.
Intuitively, I take it, Alex's belief is unjustified, whether or not the drug has actually affected
him – knowing that there's a 50% chance that he's hallucinating means that he can no longer trust his
visual experiences of geese.  Suppose, however, that Alex decides to stick to his guns, and offers the
following explanation for why: “My coworker warned me that I might suffer from hallucinations of
geese, but I know that I'm not hallucinating right now.  Evidence: I see three geese in the field.  If I
were hallucinating, I wouldn't be seeing three geese in the field, I'd only be imagining that I see three
geese.  But I'm actually seeing three geese.  So I must not be hallucinating.”  On its face, this response
seems unacceptably question-begging.  Even if Alex is one of the lucky subjects who is immune to the
effects of the drug, and his perceptions are veridical, there still seems to be something wrong with Alex
citing his visual experiences as a reason for thinking that he's not hallucinating.  The purpose of the
independence requirement is to rule out this sort of response: it forbids Alex to appeal to his visual
experiences  as  evidence,  because  they  are  not  appropriately  independent  of  the  belief-forming
mechanism whose  reliability  has  been called  into  question.   To  avoid  violating  the  independence
requirement, Alex must bracket off or prescind away from his visual experiences when determining
what he ought to believe.  And, if he does so, he will surely recognize that he is not justified in retaining
his belief that there are three geese in the field, in light of the risk that he's hallucinating.
Let  me emphasize that  there  is  no danger that  this  epistemic principle will  lead to  radical
skepticism.  To see why, it is helpful to distinguish it from a superficially similar-looking principle in
the vicinity:21
21 Vavova (2018) draws this distinction clearly.
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Strong Internalist Condition on Justification (SICJ): If we lack independent evidence that the belief-
forming mechanism which generates our beliefs in domain  D  is reliable, the justification for our  D-
related beliefs is defeated.
(SICJ) requires that we have independent evidence of a faculty's reliability before it can be used
to form justified beliefs.  But (SICJ) is too strong, and does have skeptical consequences, because we
have no way of acquiring evidence which will underwrite the reliability of the five senses, taken as a
suite,  whose  warrant  does  not  ultimately  trace  back  to  the  senses.   The  debunking  argument's
epistemic principle, in contrast, places a much weaker condition on justification: it requires only that
we lack independent evidence, on balance, for thinking that the mechanism generating our beliefs is
unreliable.  And, while it may be impossible to independently verify that our senses are reliable, we
certainly  have  no  independent  reason  for  thinking  they  are  not.   Moreover,  as  we  saw  in  the
introduction, there is  no way to mount a parallel  debunking argument against vision or the other
senses, which were, according to the best available accounts of how these faculties evolved, selected to
accurately represent the world around us.
This provides a basic overview of the calibrationist account of higher-order evidence, the source
of the debunking argument's epistemic principle.  Let me flag, however, that of all of the argument's
premises, it is the epistemic principle – more specifically, the independence requirement embedded in
the principle – which seems least secure to me.  There are a great  many cases,  like  Delusions of
Gander, where the independence requirement appears indispensable for reaching the correct verdict.
Nevertheless, other plausible and well-motivated perspectives on higher-order evidence, like Thomas
Kelly's  (2010)  total-evidence  view,  do  away  with  the  requirement,  and  I  cannot  offer  a  decisive
argument against Kelly's view here.  To a large extent, then, the success or failure of the evolutionary
debunking project will depend on the outcome of these outside debates about how we should respond
to higher-order evidence.22
22 Note, though, that even if a view like Kelly's turns out to be correct, this is not necessarily a fatal blow for the 
evolutionary debunking project.  Calibrationism undoubtedly makes things much easier for the debunker, but
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3.3 The Etiological Principle
The  etiological  principle  asserts  that  one  type  of  higher-order  evidence  which  can  call  the
reliability  of  a  belief-forming  mechanism  into  question  is  evidence  concerning  that  faculty's
evolutionary history.  Schematically:
Etiological Principle (Schema): If D-realism is true, and if we have good reason to think that the belief-
forming mechanism, M, which generates our beliefs in domain D was selected principally for functions
other than producing true D-related beliefs, then, unless we are able to corroborate that M is reliable
through the use  of  some other belief-forming mechanism whose etiology is  not subject  to similar
doubts, the balance of independent evidence suggests that M is unreliable.
In other words, if the best scientific explanation of how a belief-forming mechanism evolved
suggests  that  it  was selected primarily  for  functions other than acquiring true beliefs  in  its  target
domain, this gives us  prima facie  reason to think that that mechanism is unreliable, at least if we
choose to remain realists about the domain.23  Prima facie reason, rather than decisive reason, because
a belief-forming mechanism with a dubious etiology might still be rehabilitated if its outputs can be
corroborated using paradigmatically reliable faculties like vision or memory.  More on this in the next
section; for now, let's focus on the claim that learning that a belief-forming mechanism was selected
for a function other than producing true beliefs gives us some reason to mistrust it.
Here's a case which will help to illustrate the intuitive plausibility of the principle:
Bump in the Night
the total-evidence view still implies that higher-order evidence of unreliability will often (although not 
always) serve to defeat the justification for our first-order beliefs.  
23 Although the principle, as presented, concerns natural selection and belief-forming mechanisms, due to the 
well-known conceptual parallels between functions conferred by selection and functions conferred by design, 
it can readily be extended to apply to scientific instruments and other information-gathering artifacts as well. 
I will exploit these parallels in one example later in this section.
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Jane is a precocious eight-year-old who is deeply afraid of the dark.  Whenever her old house creaks
and groans during the night, she comes to believe that there are insidious creatures lurking in its
shadows.   To  ease  Jane's  fears,  one  day,  her  mother  tells  her  that  her  beliefs  have  a  perfectly
reasonable  explanation:  far  back  in  our  evolutionary  past,  intrepid  children  who  ventured  out  to
investigate  strange  noises  at  night  often  fell  prey  to  leopards  and other  predators,  while  timider
children who remained safely tucked into bed survived and went on to have children of their own.  As a
result,  natural  selection  favored  children  whose  nighttime-monster-related  beliefs  caused them to
remain  in  bed  after  dark,  regardless  of  the  truth  of  those  beliefs,  until  the  genes  for  nocturnal
childhood fearfulness swept throughout the population.
Intuitively, once Jane is taught that the belief-forming mechanism generating her fears was
selected to keep her in bed at night no matter what, not to produce true beliefs, this gives her good
reason to  suspect  that  it's  unreliable,  defeating the justification for  her  nighttime-monster-related
beliefs.  Notice, though, that the mother does not comment directly on the reliability of Jane's belief-
forming mechanism, only on its evolutionary history.  Hence, if the mother's story puts any pressure
on Jane to reduce her confidence in her beliefs, this must be because evidence about the evolutionary
history of our belief-forming mechanisms can affect the epistemic status of the beliefs they produce.
Bump  in  the  Night  is  an  imperfect  analogy  for  morality,  however,  because  Jane  has
independent background knowledge of what it would mean for a house to be populated by dangerous
predators after dark.  We do not have this sort of independent background knowledge when it comes
to morality: the only epistemic access we have to the moral truths (if such there be) is by way of the
faculty  targeted  by  the  evolutionary  debunking  argument.   At  the  same  time,  the  independence
requirement prohibits us from appealing to the beliefs and intuitions generated by our moral sense
once its reliability has been called into question by higher-order evidence.  But if the moral sense's
outputs are off-limits, and we have no other method for getting at the moral truths, this means the
debunker is claiming that we can determine that our moral judgments are unreliable from a position of
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complete  ignorance about morality.   Katia Vavova (2014:  92)  argues that  this  is  impossible.   She
writes: 
[W]e cannot determine if we are likely to be mistaken about morality if we can make no
assumptions at all about what morality is like... [T]he debunker’s challenge threatens
anyone who holds that the attitude-independent moral truths do not, in any helpful
way,  coincide  with  the  evolutionarily  advantageous  beliefs...  But  even  to  make  this
crucial judgment, that these two sets do not have the same contents, we need to know
something about the contents of those sets—what they are or what they are like... If we
can make no moral assumptions, then we cannot [establish] that the true evaluative
beliefs and the adaptive evaluative beliefs come apart.
Vavova thinks the debunker will need to make at least some minimal assumptions about the
nature of morality in order to establish that our moral sense is unreliable – she does not see how it
could be possible to prove that a belief-forming mechanism consistently gets things wrong if we know
nothing about the domain it's operating in.  I believe, however, that Vavova is mistaken on this score:
information about a belief-forming mechanism's etiology can establish that it's likely to be unreliable
in a given domain, even if we have no background knowledge of the domain in question, and make no
assumptions about what it's like.  To see why, consider the following case:
Metronome
An  experimental  physicist  presents  Pete  with  a  non-descript  black  box  with  an  attached  pair  of
headphones.  “This is a cutting-edge morphic resonance field detector,” the physicist tells him, “Works
just like a Geiger counter.  Try it out!”  Pete, who has never heard of morphic resonance fields before,
takes the device for a whirl, and is pleased when it gives off a satisfying clicking noise at intermittent
intervals.   Later,  Pete  notices  a  serial  number (M24601-D) and a  phone number stamped on the
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underside of the device.  Pete calls the number, and inquires after the device's provenance.  The clerk
on the other  end of  the  phone line,  after  looking up the serial  number,  informs Pete  that  it  was
designed to be a metronome, but was subsequently marked “D” for defective and discarded because it
failed to keep the time.
Once Pete discovers that the device was designed as a metronome, I take it, he should abandon
his belief that it reliably detects morphic resonance fields, and retreat to a position of agnosticism on
the subject instead.  Pete, in other words, ought to be skeptical whether the device really works as a
morphic  resonance  detector,  while  at  the  same  time  suspending  judgment  about  what  morphic
resonance fields are, what they are like, and whether they even exist in the first place.  This implies
that Vavova's objection is false – learning that a belief-forming mechanism has a deviant etiology can
give us reason to think that  it's  unreliable at  getting at  the  D-related truths,  even if  we make no
assumptions about the nature of D, and approach D from a position of total ignorance.  If we apply this
lesson from Metronome to the moral case, it suggests that information about our evolutionary history
does have the power to establish that our moral sense is likely to be unreliable, even if we bracket off
all  of  our  pre-existing  beliefs  about  the  nature  of  morality,  and adopt  an  attitude  of  agnosticism
towards the subject instead.
In both Bump in the Night and Metronome, an agent acquiring information about the causal
history of her beliefs suggests that the mechanism producing those beliefs is unreliable.  But we are
still in need of an explanation for why this is so, for why a connection like this should hold between a
belief-forming mechanism's etiology and its reliability in the present day.  Here is what I think is going
on in these cases: take a trait or artifact which was selected or designed for some function, φ-ing, and
pick some other use it might be put to, ψ-ing.  In the abstract, what are the chances that it will be
successful at ψ-ing?  They are slim.  We know, from our familiarity with the natural world and with
human  inventions,  that  traits  or  artifacts  selected  or  designed  for  one  function  will  generally  be
incapable of carrying out most other tasks you can name.  To be sure, there are many cases in biology
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of adaptations being successfully repurposed,  just  as there are many examples of humans putting
artifacts to creative, off-label uses.  But, for an adaptation or artifact operating outside of its area of
functional specialization, the realm of tasks that it's unable to perform will inevitably dwarf the realm
of tasks that it's able to perform successfully.  This means that it's highly unlikely that an adaptation
will succeed at performing some arbitrarily-chosen task for which it was not selected.
To illustrate,  take the heart,  which was selected to circulate the blood.  It  also has a small
number of other effects, for instance, it generates a nice percussive rhythm, and is a rich source of
vitamins if eaten.  But it is hopeless at composing sonatas, at shielding us from the rain, at performing
arithmetic,  at  grasping and manipulating objects,  at filtering toxins from the body, and so on, for
virtually  any  other  use  we might  wish to  put  it  to.   The same is  true  for  all  adaptations  we  are
acquainted with: their usefulness seldom extends far beyond the function or set of functions for which
they were selected.  This, I think, is the intuition at the heart of evolutionary debunking arguments:
evidence that the function of a belief-forming mechanism or artifact is to φ is equally evidence that it
will not serve to ψ.24  Thus, evidence that a device was designed as a metronome is evidence that it
does not detect morphic resonance fields, and evidence that our moral sense was selected to promote
cooperation is evidence that it does not reliably produce true moral beliefs.25
24 Note that this rule is only intended as a statistical generalization, which means that evidence that a belief-
forming mechanism was selected to φ has the potential to be screened off – rendered probabilistically 
irrelevant – by more specific information about the nature of φ-ing and ψ-ing.  The rule is important here 
because of the context created by the independence requirement, where we are bracketing off the outputs of 
the belief-forming mechanism in question, and evaluating its reliability from a position of relative ignorance.  
This will often leave us without much admissible information about the nature of ψ-ing, allowing facts about 
the belief-forming mechanism's causal history to take on a larger evidential role.  A slightly different type of 
example will help to illustrate: knowing nothing about pharmacognosy, you should think it unlikely that a 
piece of tree bark would be effective at curing a headache, because bark is selected to protect the tree's inner 
layers from the elements, not to produce medically valuable effects in humans.  But the evidential significance
of this fact about the evolved function of tree bark would be screened off by knowledge that the bark in 
question comes from the willow tree, and so contains the compound salicin, from which aspirin was derived.
25 Several authors, including Berker (2014), have wondered whether the success of evolutionary debunking 
arguments really does depend on the finer details of human evolution, or whether the debunking argument's 
force instead comes from the fact that our moral beliefs have any causal history at all.  The rationale for the 
etiological principle I have presented here suggests that the details of how we evolved do matter.  For the 
debunking argument to work, it is essential that (to the best of our knowledge) our moral sense was selected 
for a function other than generating true moral beliefs.  Other possible etiologies will not be as congenial to 
the debunker.  For instance, were we to discover that our moral beliefs have never been shaped by selection at
all, and are instead the product of a completely domain-neutral information-processing mechanism in the 
brain, it is not clear that an evolutionary debunking argument targeting moral realism would be viable.
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The realist has an obvious rejoinder here: perhaps a trait selected for one function is likely to be
useless at some wholly distinct task.  But what if the two tasks are not distinct, or if we are unsure
whether  they  are  distinct?   Morality,  after  all,  presents  itself  as  being  centrally  concerned  with
cooperation, so if we trust what our moral intuitions tell us about the nature of morality, we should
expect there to be substantial overlap between the true moral beliefs and those beliefs which make us
into better cooperators.  And, if morality is systematically linked to prosocial behavior in this way, a
faculty selected to facilitate cooperation might well succeed, as a side effect, at reliably generating true
moral beliefs.
This response is seductive, but it begs the question.  So far as I can tell, we believe that morality
is connected to cooperation only because our moral  sense intimates to us  that  this  is  so,  because
cooperative actions seem intuitively right to us, while antisocial actions seem intuitively wrong.  It's
just not clear what genuinely independent epistemic path there could be to reaching this conclusion.
But this means the realist is attempting to use the outputs of a faculty called into question by higher-
order evidence in order to vindicate the epistemic credentials of  that  very same faculty.   In other
words, she is relying on our moral intuitions in order to prove that our moral intuitions are reliable.
This is a paradigmatic violation of the independence requirement, no different in principle than Alex
citing  his  visual  experiences  of  geese  as  proof  that  he  is  not  suffering  from  goose-related
hallucinations.   On  the  other  hand,  if  we  bracket  off  our  moral  intuitions  and  attend  to  the
independent evidence alone, as calibrationism requires, we will then be left with no reason to think
there  is  any  particular  connection  between  morality  and  cooperation.   We  cannot,  of  course,
completely rule out the possibility that they're somehow related, but anyone who invests more than a
little credence in this possibility is almost certainly allowing her judgment to be illicitly swayed by her
moral intuitions.  As a result, since we have no independent grounds for thinking that beliefs which
promote  cooperation  will  also  tend  to  coincide  with  the  moral  truths,  the  realist's  objection  is
unsuccessful.26
26 I discuss a related objection, involving so-called third-factor explanations, in Section 4.2.
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To sum up: I have used Bump in the Night and Metronome to motivate the schematic version
of the debunking argument's etiological principle, and offered a rationale for why we should think the
principle holds, a rationale that draws on inductive reasoning from our past experience with artifacts
and adaptations.  But, even supposing I were mistaken about this rationale,  Bump in the Night  and
Metronome present a compelling case for the etiological principle on their own.  When Jane and Pete
learn that their beliefs have a deviant etiology, this certainly seems to suggest that the mechanism
generating their beliefs is unreliable, and it is difficult to see why the same reasoning should not apply
to our moral sense as well.  At minimum, the realist owes us an explanation for why we should reject
the etiological principle when it comes to the evolution of morality, when it seems to reach the right
verdict across a range of similar cases.
 
3.4 The Autonomy Clause
The etiological principle leaves open a way for a belief-forming mechanism with a dubious
etiology to be rehabilitated, if its outputs can be corroborated through the use of some other faculty
whose epistemic credentials are above reproach.  The purpose of the autonomy clause is to close off
this escape hatch.  Here is a schematic version of the autonomy clause:
Autonomy  Clause  (Schema):  We are  unable to  corroborate  that  our  D-related  beliefs  are reliable
through the use  of  some other belief-forming mechanism whose etiology is  not subject  to similar
doubts.
For a case where the autonomy clause comes out false, take literacy.  We have good reason to
think that  the  cognitive  mechanism we employ  in  reading  or  writing  was  selected  principally  for
functions other than producing true beliefs about the written word, namely, that literacy emerged too
recently in our evolutionary history to have engaged natural selection to any significant degree.  The
best explanation of our literary competence is that it is what Stephen J. Gould and Richard Lewontin
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(1979) call a spandrel, a byproduct of our faculties for processing the spoken word, rather than an
adaptation. Happily, though, literacy's reliability can readily be corroborated through the use of the
senses, spoken language, and memory.  Each time we inscribe a message on paper, ask a friend or
colleague to read it, and observe that their interpretation of its contents, repeated back to us, jibes with
our own, we independently confirm that our faculties for understanding the written world are reliable.
Consequently,  the  autonomy  clause  is  false  when  it  comes  to  literacy,  which  means  that  an
evolutionary debunking argument targeting our ability to read would fail at this stage.
I  do not believe it  will  be possible to  rehabilitate  our moral  sense by a similar  procedure,
however,  because  morality  presents  itself  as  being  independent  from other  domains  of  inquiry.27
Moral truths, I take it, cannot be verified empirically, and play no role in our best scientific theories.
This is as it should be.  If empirical evidence could be brought to bear on foundational moral claims, it
would  be  possible  for  some  future  scientific  discovery  to  overturn  our  most  deeply-held  moral
convictions,  just  as  past  scientific  discoveries  forced us to accept that  the apparent motion of  the
heavens is an illusion produced by the diurnal rotation of the Earth, and that the apparent acceleration
of objects in free fall is an illusion created by the curvature of spacetime around the Earth's mass.  This
would mean that empirical evidence could one day show, for instance, that we in fact have a pro tanto
duty to  torture children, or that comforting the afflicted is a great moral evil.  Surely, though, these
claims are false, and no scientific discovery could or should ever convince us otherwise.  But the price
of  insulating our moral beliefs from scientific refutation is that they cannot lay claim to empirical
confirmation.  Hence, if we cannot trust the deliverances of our moral sense, none of our moral beliefs
will be justified, because there is nowhere else we can turn to for aid.
3.5 The Empirical Premise
I have little to say here about the empirical premise.  At this point, a large number of scientific
27 There is a large volume of literature on this topic (see, for instance, Larmore [2008] and McPherson [2008]) 
that I cannot hope to adequately summarize here.  In what follows I will focus on presenting what I take to be 
the most compelling reason for thinking that the autonomy clause is true of morality.
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and philosophical treatises have been written on the evolutionary history of morality in humans. 28
Most assign selection for prosocial attitudes and cooperation a pivotal role in this history, while none,
to my knowledge, suggest that our moral sense was selected to produce true beliefs about a mind-
independent domain of morals.  Readers who still wish to reserve judgment on the matter, however,
are free to set aside the empirical premise and read the debunking argument as (doubly) conditional
instead: if both the empirical premise and moral realism are true, then the justification for our moral
beliefs is defeated.  
3.6 Putting It All Together
Let's recap.  Research on the evolutionary history of the human moral sense suggests that it
was selected not to produce true moral beliefs, but to allow us to reap the benefits of cooperating with
other members of our species.  Because it's unlikely that a faculty selected to promote cooperation will
also succeed at  reliably producing true moral beliefs,  this  gives  us higher-order  evidence that  our
moral  sense  is  unreliable.   Our  moral  beliefs  might  still  be  rehabilitated  if  it  were  possible  to
corroborate them through the use of some other faculty with impeccable epistemic credentials, but,
due to morality's autonomy from other domains of inquiry, no outside help is forthcoming.  The only
basis we have for thinking our moral sense is reliable is that it is self-certifying, that our moral beliefs
present themselves as being true to us, but the independence requirement forbids cognitive faculties
from vindicating themselves in the face of higher-order evidence of unreliability.  Hence, learning that
the human moral sense was selected in our ancestors for purposes other than acquiring true moral
beliefs systematically defeats the justification for our moral beliefs, and forces us to embrace moral
skepticism – so long, that is, as we insist on remaining moral realists.
4. Objections and Replies
28 For a variety of perspectives, see, in addition to Joyce (2006), Alexander (1987), Richerson and Boyd (2005), 
Hauser (2006), Bowles and Gintis (2011), Kitcher (2011), Baumard et al. (2012), Boehm (2012), Tomasello 
(2016), and Sterelny (2021).
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4.1 Moorean Responses
A  natural  reply  to  evolutionary  debunking  arguments,  developed  by  Jonathan  Fuqua
(forthcoming), takes its inspiration from G.E. Moore.  Many of the realist's putative moral truths, like
that it is wrong to torture small children regardless of whether or not anyone believes that it is, seem
self-evident, indeed, practically indisputable.  As Fuqua (forthcoming: 274) puts it, this is a claim that
“nearly every sane person would believe were it brought before the mind’s eye.”  The most that can be
said for the premises of an evolutionary debunking argument, in contrast, is that they enjoy modest
plausibility upon reflection.  Consequently, since we are vastly more confident that our moral beliefs
are justified than we are in any of the evolutionary debunking argument's premises, a realist might
insist that all the debunking argument can really succeed at proving is that one of its premises is false
for some subtle reason which eludes us at present.  
Unfortunately,  the  connections  between  evolutionary  debunking  and  other  cases  involving
higher-order evidence and defeat make it clear that this response won't do.  Alex, from Delusions of
Gander, might find his visual experiences of geese utterly compelling, but he still is not justified in
trusting those experiences once he finds out there's a good chance that he's hallucinating.  Similarly,
Jane, the child protagonist from  Bump in the Night, is no longer justified in believing that sinister
creatures are lurking in her house's shadows at night once she hears about the evolutionary origins of
her beliefs, no matter how vivid her fears may seem to her.  We would not accept a Moorean argument
from Alex or Jane as an appropriate reason for them to ignore the higher-order evidence they've been
presented with, and consistency demands we say the same thing about evolutionary debunking and
moral realism as well.   Higher-order evidence has the power to defeat  even our most deeply-held
beliefs,  and a  subject  who sticks to her guns in the face of higher-order evidence that  the faculty
producing her beliefs is unreliable is simply being irrational.29  Hence, because evolutionary debunking
arguments purport to offer higher-order evidence that our moral sense is unreliable, it is no help just
29 According to calibrationism, that is.  Philosophers who reject calibrationism, or who wish to restrict its scope, 
may insist that there is a privileged set of beliefs, perhaps including some moral beliefs, which are so obvious 
or self-evident that they can never be defeated by higher-order evidence. 
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to  point  to  the  manifest  wrongness  of  torturing  children.   Moral  realists  who  wish  to  resist  the
debunking argument's conclusion must come up with a compelling reason to reject one of its premises.
4.2 Third-Factor Explanations
One popular response to evolutionary debunking arguments is to invoke so-called third-factor
explanations, which deny the argument's etiological principle, and insist that our moral sense could
turn  out  to  be  reliable  even  if  it  was  selected  for  purposes  other  than  producing  true  beliefs.30
Although the details of these accounts differ, I will follow Selim Berker (2014) in interpreting them as
making claims about the grounding of moral facts.  The idea is this: while our moral sense may not
have been selected to acquire true moral beliefs per se, it was selected to track some set of natural facts
– perhaps natural facts connected to survival (Enoch 2010), consciousness (Wielenberg 2010), pain
(Skarsaune 2011), or well-being (Brosnan 2011) – which (at least partially) ground the moral facts.  If
some such grounding relationship holds, there is little mystery in how our moral sense could turn out
to be reliable.   Selection predisposes us to  believe that  survival  and well-being are good,  and the
survival and well-being facts ground the facts about moral goodness, so our moral beliefs will, by and
large, tend to come out true. 
Calbrationists  will  reject  third-factor  explanations  as  violations  of  the  independence
requirement introduced in Section 3.2.  The  reason why the realist's claims about grounding seem
plausible to us is because they agree with our moral intuitions, which tell us that survival is good, that
pain is bad, and so on, but the independence requirement obliges us to bracket off our moral intuitions
when evaluating higher-order evidence that our moral sense is unreliable.  And it is hard to see how we
could have any insight into what grounds the moral facts that is genuinely independent of our first-
order moral beliefs and intuitions.  Once we prescind away from the outputs of our moral sense, we
have no more reason to think that facts about moral goodness are grounded in facts about survival and
30 For compelling criticism of third-factor explanations along different lines than those pursued here, see Lutz 
(2018).  Tersman (2017) and Klenk (2020) discuss third-factor explanations in the context of moral 
disagreement.
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well-being  than  to  think  they  are  grounded  in  facts  about  death  and  misery.   Indeed,  if  we're
prohibited from citing our moral intuitions as evidence, it's not clear why we should think there ever
were any moral facts in the first place.  As a result, because third-factor explanations covertly depend
on the outputs of our moral sense for their justification, these explanations runs afoul of the epistemic
principle's independence requirement, and so beg the question in favor of moral realism.
4.3 Debunking Without A Moral Sense
Edouard Machery and Ron Mallon (2010) challenge the assumption, built into the debunking
argument's  empirical  premise,  that  we,  as  human  beings,  have  a  cognitive  faculty  which  can
reasonably be described as a moral sense.  They begin by distinguishing three different theses about
the evolution of morality, and then evaluate the empirical evidence for each.  A first thesis, which
Machery and Mallon (2010: 5) take to be relatively uncontroversial, is that some components of moral
cognition –  they suggest the grab bag of “emotions, dispositions, rule-based reasoning systems, or
concepts” – have been shaped by natural selection.  The second thesis they consider is that normative
cognition, a general faculty for reasoning about normative concepts like obligation and permission, is
an adaptation.  This claim, they argue, has a fair amount of empirical evidence in its favor.  Machery
and Mallon are more skeptical of the third and strongest thesis, that our capacity for specifically moral
cognition is  an adaptation.   And it  is  this  third thesis,  they believe,  that  is  needed to  underwrite
evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism.
There is plenty of room to find fault with Machery and Mallon's interpretation of the science.
In particular, it is not clear to me how much difference there really is between their third thesis and the
conjunction of the first two.  But I will not pursue this line of argument here.  Instead, I wish to push
back against  their  contention that  only the third thesis  is  strong enough to serve as  the basis for
evolutionary debunking arguments.
Let us suppose that only the weakest and least controversial of Machery and Mallon's theses,
that certain components of moral cognition have been shaped by natural selection, is true.  A lot hangs
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on which components, exactly, fit the bill.  Consider the following two claims:
The Lives of Others: The lives, interests, and well-being of others have value, and should be given some
independent weight in our deliberations.
Bidding from the Outside: Sometimes we ought to do things we do not want to do and that will not
advance our interests.
I take The Lives of Others and Bidding from the Outside to be fundamental presuppositions of
all ethical theories, all ethical theories, that is, aside from some vulgar forms of egoism with negligible
appeal.  If natural selection did not predispose us to accept these claims, or, at least, to reason and
deliberate as though we do, it seems fair to say that morality is in no real sense an adaptation.  If this is
the case, the philosophers and scientists cited in Section 3.5 are badly mistaken about how morality
evolved, and the debunking argument's  empirical  premise is  false.   If,  on the other hand,  natural
selection did predispose us to think that  the lives of other human beings have value,  and that we
should sometimes act against our own interests – not because these beliefs are true, but because they
promote cooperation, and cooperation improved our ancestors' chances at survival and reproduction –
this will be sufficient to get an evolutionary debunking argument off the ground.  If we have good
reason to suspect that we accept the core presuppositions of ethical thought only because they made
our ancestors into better cooperators, that will  undermine the justification for our beliefs in those
presuppositions, and no project in ethics can succeed if beliefs as foundational as The Lives of Others
and Bidding from the Outside turn out to be unjustified.31
Consider, also, that worries analogous to Machery and Mallon's do not strike us as the slightest
bit compelling when it comes to the Transarcturians from Fools Rush In.  Our verdict about their case,
that learning of the Earth scientists'  discovery undermines the justification for their forbiddenness
31 Compare Morton (2016) on this point.
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beliefs,  does not seem to depend on which of Machery and Mallon's three theses is  true of them.
Perhaps  selection  endowed  the  Transarcturians  with  a  domain-specific  forbiddenness  faculty,  or
perhaps only with a general faculty for normative cognition together with some basic forbiddenness
components.  It is difficult to see how this makes any difference.  Once the Transarcturians find out
about the possible evolutionary origins of their forbiddenness beliefs, their underlying conviction that
there  are  any forbiddenness  facts  at  all  loses  its  justification  and must  be  discarded,  which casts
everything else they believe about the forbidden zones into doubt as well.  
By parity of reasoning, the success of evolutionary debunking arguments does not depend on
how much of our moral cognition is an adaptation; it is enough that selection, in order to facilitate
cooperation in our ancestors, shaped our minds to be predisposed to accept The Lives of Others and
Bidding from the Outside without regard for whether they are true.  And, if our confidence in these
theses turn out to be unjustified, the rest of our moral beliefs will be subject to defeat as well, as the
fruit of the poisonous tree.  
5. Conclusion
Let's suppose that the debunking argument developed in this paper ultimately proves to be
flawed.  Does that mean the realist is out of the woods?  Not quite – the realist still needs to contend
with the bare analogy presented by Fools Rush In.  After all, it seems clear that the justification for the
Transarcturians' forbiddenness beliefs is defeated once they hear the Earth scientists' revelation about
their evolutionary history, and it is difficult to see why, other than pure chauvinism, we should think
our moral beliefs are any better off epistemically.  Hence, no response to the evolutionary debunking
argument developed in this paper can be considered complete unless it also explains why the apparent
analogy between morality and the forbidden zones does not, in fact, hold.
This  concludes  my  case  for  the  thesis  that  evolutionary  debunking  arguments,  properly
formulated, present a powerful challenge to moral realism.  I have said little, however, about how I
think we should conceive of morality, if it is not to be construed realistically.  Although I do not have
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space to discuss my own views at any length here, I suggest we should take seriously the proposal that
morality is an adaptive illusion, one built  into our minds by natural selection in order to facilitate
cooperation  among  our  hunter-gatherer  ancestors.32  Thus,  the  metaphysics  of  morality  is  the
metaphysics  of  illusions,  the  epistemology  of  morality  is  the  epistemology  of  illusions,  and  the
semantics of morality is the semantics of illusions.  I do not believe morality is unique in this respect –
I follow Daniel Dennett (1991; 2013; 2016; 2017) in thinking that much of our conscious interface with
the world, what he calls the manifest image, is an illusion created by selection to aid us in navigating
our physical  and social  environment.   It  takes only  a little  reflection on the aim and workings of
natural  selection  to  convince  yourself  that  this  might  be  so.   Selection's  focus  on  survival  and
reproduction is single-minded and absolute; it has no special love for truth, and it will eagerly pack our
minds with illusions, other evolutionary constraints permitting, whenever doing so contributes to our
reproductive fitness.  It should come as no surprise, then, if the moral sense, which presents itself as a
window onto a mind-independent domain of morals, instead turns out to be a sham mirror pointed
squarely back into our evolutionary past.
32 To the best of my knowledge, this view originates with Ruse (1986).
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